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LITIGATING DISCRIMINATION: LESSONS 
FROM THE FRONT LINES 
Deborah L. Rhode 
I got to know Clare Dalton in 1985, the year that the 
Harvard Law School faculty failed to grant her tenure. I was 
visiting at Harvard, and this was my first exposure to a sex 
discrimination claim at close range. It was a profoundly 
unsettling experience. What did it say about the future for 
feminists in legal education if this could happen to someone as 
talented and deserving as Clare at a place like Harvard? 
If there was anything redeeming about the experience, it was 
the opportunity to see someone survive a discrimination case 
with her dignity, commitments, and reputation intact. This essay 
seeks to account for that rare experience. What was typical 
about the challenges that her litigation posed, and distinctive 
about the way that she addressed them? Her case, together with 
similar discrimination claims, holds broader lessons about the 
capacities and constraints of law in pursuit of social justice. 
I. EVIDENTIARY HURDLES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
CASES  
Employment discrimination cases are, as research 
demonstrates, “exceedingly difficult to win.”1 They are also 
                                                 
 Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Center on the 
Legal Profession, Stanford University. The research assistance of Laurel 
Schroeder and the comments of Clare Dalton are gratefully acknowledged.  
1 Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential 
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 115 
(2007) (citing studies); accord Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart Schwab, 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse, 
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103, 113 (2009) [hereinafter Employment 
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difficult to settle on terms that adequately compensate for the 
costs of complaining. Fewer than a fifth of sex and race 
discrimination claims filed with the federal Equal Opportunity 
Commission result in outcomes favorable to the complainant.2 
Settlements in these cases are generally modest, and only two 
percent of complaints result in victory at trial.3 About forty 
percent of trial wins are only temporary; they are reversed on 
appeal.4 Lawsuits of the kind Clare Dalton brought, alleging 
discrimination against lawyers or law professors, almost never 
produce a final judgment for the complainant.5 
Plaintiffs in upper-level employment positions face multiple 
obstacles. Part of the problem is the mismatch between legal 
                                                 
Discrimination Plaintiffs] (noting that compared to other plaintiffs, 
employment discrimination complainants manage fewer early resolutions and 
win a lower proportion of trials and appeals); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. 
Nelson & Ryan Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal 
Mobilization: Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post-Civil Rights 
United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 187, 195–96 (2010) (noting 
that only about two percent of plaintiffs win in court); Michael Selmi, Why 
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 
555, 561–69 (2001) (exploring reasons for the low success rate of 
employment discrimination plaintiffs). See generally Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (finding low success rates 
for employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal court).  
2 Race-Based Charges, F.Y. 1997-2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm (last visited Feb. 
2, 2012); Sex-Based Charges, F.Y. 1997-2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sex. 
cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).  
3 Kotkin, supra note 1, at 144 (noting mean recovery of $54,651); 
Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 1, at 187. 
4 Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 
1, at 111. 
5 See Eyana J. Smith, Employment Discrimination in the Firm: Does the 
Legal System Provide Remedies for Women and Minority Members of the 
Bar?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 789, 789, 799–803 (2007). For a 
discussion of these difficulties, see Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to 
Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1041, 1065–68 (2011); and David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and 
Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE 
GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999)). 
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definitions of discrimination and the social patterns that produce 
it. The most common way for professionals to establish a claim 
is to prove that they were treated differently on the basis of a 
prohibited characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, or sex.6 If an 
employer offers a non-discriminatory reason for the treatment, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it is an obvious 
pretext. In cases involving mixed motives, if an employer can 
establish that non-discriminatory reasons would have produced 
the same outcome, then a plaintiff can only recover injunctive 
relief and attorney’s fees.7 In effect, the law forces a choice 
between two overly simplistic accounts of workplace decision 
making. The basis for an employer’s decision must be judged 
either biased, or unbiased; its justifications sincere, or 
fabricated. Yet in life rather than law, legitimate concerns and 
group prejudices are often intertwined, and bias operates at 
unconscious levels throughout the evaluation process rather than 
simply at conscious levels at the time a decision is made.8 Most 
of what produces different outcomes in upper-level employment 
contexts is not a function of demonstrably discriminatory 
treatment. Rather, these outcomes reflect interactions shaped by 
unconscious assumptions and organizational practices that 
“cannot be traced to the sexism [or racism of an identifiable] 
bad actor.”9  
So, too, the subjectivity of standards and lack of 
transparency in upper-level employment decisions generally 
makes it difficult for individuals to know or to prove that they 
have been subject to bias. Unless and until they assume the costs 
                                                 
6 Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
For an overview, see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 89 (2010). 
7 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); BARTLETT & 
RHODE, supra note 6. 
8 DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 160 (1997); Linda Hamilton 
Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 
(1995).  
9 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 471 (2001).  
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of suing, they may have little idea of whether they have a suit 
worth bringing. Not all differential treatment leaves a paper 
trail, and colleagues with corroborating evidence are often 
reluctant to expose it for fear of jeopardizing their own 
positions.10 Plaintiffs like Dalton who are denied promotion 
seldom know until after discovery how closely their files 
resemble those of successful candidates.  
Ann Hopkins, an accountant who successfully sued Price 
Waterhouse, had no specific proof that sexist comments had 
been made about her or any other woman at the firm at the time 
she filed her complaint.11 Although she had received advice that 
she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear makeup and jewelry, [and have her] hair 
styled,” she had viewed these suggestions as “nonsense” rather 
than evidence of bias.12 In fact, the record ultimately revealed 
ample evidence of sexist stereotyping. Female accountants were 
faulted for being “curt,” “brusque,” or “women’s libber[s],” or 
for acting like “one of the boys.”13 Hopkins herself was 
characterized as someone who “overcompensated for being a 
woman” by acting “macho” and “overbearing” and needed “a 
course at charm school.”14 Yet several male accountants who 
achieved partnership had been similarly described—as 
“abrasive,” “overbearing,” and “cocky.”15 No one suggested 
charm school for them.  
                                                 
10 Deborah L. Rhode & Joan Williams, Legal Perspectives on 
Employment Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 243 
(Faye J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S. Ann Ropp eds., 2007); Riordan 
v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).  
11 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C. 
1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); ANN BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: 
MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY 172 (1996).  
12 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 148; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Story 
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 
65, 69 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (quoting Ann Hopkins).  
13 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.  
14 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 235.  
15 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1115, 1117.  
 Litigating Discrimination 329 
So, too, Nancy Ezold, the associate who sued the 
Philadelphia firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen for 
discrimination after being denied a partnership, learned only 
after discovery how her performance evaluations stacked up 
against those of male colleagues who were promoted. She had 
been characterized as too “assertive,” too preoccupied with 
“women’s issues” and too lacking in analytic ability.16 Yet, 
some of the male associates who became partners had been 
described as “not real smart,” “overly confrontational,” “very 
lazy,” and “more sizzle than steak.”17  
Even when plaintiffs can produce evidence of sex-based 
stereotypes and double standards, courts sometimes discount its 
significance. “Stray remarks” in the workplace are insufficient 
to establish liability if a defendant can demonstrate some 
legitimate reason for the unfavorable treatment.18 In one 
unsuccessful tenure case decided the same year as Dalton’s 
denial, a female professor introduced comments describing 
herself as too feminine: “unassuming, unaggressive, 
unassertive, and not highly motivated for vigorous 
interpersonal competition.”19 Yet both the lower and appellate 
courts dismissed such comments as related not to gender but 
simply to “the effect of her personality on graduate 
students . . . .”20 Nancy Ezold similarly lost her case on appeal 
despite evidence of a double standard. The court found that 
comments about her reflected concern over her abilities, rather 
than an “obvious or manifest” pretext on the part of the firm.21 
The outcome of Ezold’s case is similar to that in one of the 
nation’s only reported race discrimination trials involving a law 
firm promotion decision. Larry Mungin was a lateral hire to the 
                                                 
16 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 
1188–89 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev’d, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992).  
17 Ezold, 751 F. Supp. at 1185–87.  
18 Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Ezold, 
983 F.2d at 544–46; Deborah L. Rhode, What’s Sex Got to Do With It?: 
Diversity in the Legal Profession, in LEGAL ETHICS: LAW STORIES 233, 241 
(Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2006).  
19 Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1984). 
20 Id. at 94. 
21 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 534; see also Rhode, supra note 18, at 243. 
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District of Columbia branch office of Katten Muchin & Zavis. A 
black graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, 
with six years experience in bankruptcy law, Mungin fell 
through the cracks of the firm’s mentoring and business 
development efforts. A two-and-a-half-million dollar jury verdict 
in his favor was reversed on appeal by judges who saw him as a 
victim not of racial bias but merely “business as usual 
mismanagement.”22 Problems of proof are compounded in 
contexts like tenure evaluations, where ostensibly “objective” 
evaluations are obtained through a process that may be 
anything but objective. In a politically charged atmosphere, 
such as the one at Harvard Law School during the 1980s when 
Clare Dalton sought tenure, assessments of scholarly merit are 
likely to depend on who is doing the assessing.  
Nancy Gertner, Dalton’s lawyer, highlighted an obvious 
flaw in Dalton’s tenure evaluation. The panel of outside 
reviewers that Harvard President Derek Bok appointed to 
consider the case consisted of no one “even conversant with 
Critical Legal Studies,” the approach that Dalton’s scholarship 
reflected.23 A second problem was that the standard that 
President Bok asked the reviewers to apply was not the one 
applicable at Harvard at the time, but the one that they would 
use to assess the qualifications of someone at any leading law 
school.24 Yet, as Dalton later noted, it was hardly an even 
playing field when the five male candidates up for tenure were 
“judged by an internal standard and the sole female candidate by 
a ‘universal’ standard.”25  
Given these evidentiary hurdles, it should come as no 
surprise that individuals who perceive themselves as subject to 
employment discrimination seldom file formal complaints.26 
                                                 
22 Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1927, 1933. 
23 Emily M. Bernstein, Bok Rejects Dalton Tenure Appeal, HARV. 
CRIMSON (Feb. 9, 2003), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/2/9/bok-
rejects-dalton-tenure-appeal-ppresident (quoting Dalton’s lawyer Nancy 
Gertner).  
24 Email from Clare Dalton to author (Sept. 28, 2010) (on file with 
author).  
25 Id. 
26 See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation 
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Their reluctance is reinforced by the personal costs of 
adversarial processes.  
II. THE PERSONAL PRICE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
The costs of a discrimination case can be substantial, both in 
financial and psychological terms. Ann Hopkins’ legal fees for 
her seven-year suit against Price Waterhouse totaled over 
$800,000 in today’s dollars.27 Even if a plaintiff finds an 
attorney to take the case on a contingent fee basis, the out-of-
pocket litigation expenses can be steep; Nancy Ezold estimated 
hers at over $150,000 in today’s dollars.28 Plaintiffs also put 
their professional lives on trial, and the profiles that emerge are 
seldom entirely flattering. In listening to defense witnesses, 
Hopkins “felt as if [her] personality were being dissected like a 
diseased frog in the biology lab.”29 In some cases, complainants’ 
foibles become fodder for the national press. The lead plaintiff 
who sued Sullivan and Cromwell in one of the nation’s first law 
firm sex discrimination cases had her “mediocre law school 
grades” aired in the Wall Street Journal.30 A gay associate who 
sued the same firm three decades later found himself described 
in New York Magazine as a “smarmy,” “paranoid kid with a 
persecution complex.”31 In Ezold’s case, a Wolf Block senior 
                                                 
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 
642 (1980–81). For a discussion of the reasons behind the lack of formal 
complaints, see Kristin Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A 
Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421, 424–27 (1987).  
27 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 384 ($500,000 in 1991 dollars). See the 
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_ 
calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012), to make the conversion to today’s 
dollars.  
28 Rhode, supra note 18, at 246 ($100,000 in 1993 dollars). See the 
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_ 
calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012), to make the conversion to today’s 
dollars. 
29 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 197.  
30 FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 193 
(2009) (discussing litigation against Sullivan and Cromwell).  
31 Robert Kolker, The Gay Flannel Suit, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 25, 
2007), http://nymag.com/news/features/28515/.  
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partner told the American Lawyer that she was like the 
proverbial “ugly girl. Everybody says she has a great 
personality. It turns out that [Nancy] didn’t even have a great 
personality.”32  
Even favorable press accounts often deliver backhanded 
compliments that would make any potential litigant think twice. 
A Boston Globe profile of Clare Dalton noted: “She doesn’t 
sound like some crazed feminist spouting anti-male sexual, 
political or legal jargon that would allow her to be dubbed a 
strident female.”33 More of the same appeared in a New York 
Times portrait of Shannon Faulkner, the woman who sued for 
admission to the Citadel, South Carolina’s all-male military 
academy. Faulkner was not a “cantankerous man hater, lesbian, 
or ugly duckling out to find a mate.”34 
Although many potential plaintiffs are drawn to litigation as 
a way of demonstrating their capabilities and restoring their 
reputations, the result is often the opposite. Complaining about 
bias risks making individuals seem too “aggressive,” 
“confrontational,” or “oversensitive”; they may be typecast as a 
“troublemaker,” “bitch,” or an “angry black.”35 Advice from 
                                                 
32 Loren Feldman, What’s Sex Got to Do With It? Partnership on Trial, 
AM. LAW., Nov. 1990, at 56, available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ 
files/partnership-on-trial----november-1990.pdf (quoting Charles Kopp). 
33 Patti Doten, The Law Professor Who Sued Harvard Tells Why the 
Deck is Stacked Against Women, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 36.  
34 Catherine S. Manegold, The Citadel’s Lone Wolf; Shannon Faulkner, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 11, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/11/ 
magazine/the-citadel-s-lone-wolf-shannon-faulkner.html?pagewanted=all.  
35 JANET E. GANS EPNER, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, 
VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 25 (2006) 
(“aggressive,” “bitch”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN 
THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 21 (2001) (“troublemaker,” “oversensitive”); JOAN C. WILLIAMS 
& VETA T. RICHARDSON, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY RETENTION, NEW 
MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING?: THE IMPACT OF LAW FIRM 
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS ON WOMEN 38 (2010) (“confrontational”); Jill L. 
Cruz & Melinda S. Molina, Hispanic National Bar Association National 
Study on the Status of Latinas in the Legal Profession, Few and Far Between: 
The Reality of Latina Lawyers, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1019 (2010) (“rock 
the boat”); Nancy M. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken 
Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 
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colleagues is generally to “let bygones be bygones,” “let it lie,” 
“[d]on’t make waves, just move on.”36 Those who ignore that 
advice frequently experience informal retaliation and 
blacklisting; “professional suicide” is a common description.37 
As one plaintiff’s attorney put it, a “mid or high level attorney 
who decide[s] to sue in connection with a cutback or firing may 
never eat lunch in [this] town again.”38  
Reported cases bear this out. Hopkins found herself “a 
pariah in the Big Eight” accounting firms.39 Lawrence Mungin 
had a similar experience. As he testified at trial, other firms 
“may admire me, but they won’t hire me. I am a 
whistleblower . . . . I am persona non grata. My career is dead. 
That is what I think. That is what I found. That is what I 
know.”40 Darlene Jesperson, a bartender who unsuccessfully 
sued Harrah’s Casino for gender discrimination in its grooming 
code, failed to find another job. As her attorney noted, for 
anyone in the entertainment industry, “Reno is a small town.”41  
Shannon Faulkner paid a still higher price for her challenge 
to the exclusion of women from the Citadel. While her suit was 
pending, she attended the school as a day student, and 
experienced constant intimidation, vilification, and isolation. She 
                                                 
69 (2004) (“bitch”); Marcia Coyle, Black Lawyer’s Life, Suit Told by a White 
Author, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at A14 (quoting Lawrence Mungin, 
“angry black”).  
36 For the advice, see Kolker, supra note 31; and EPNER, supra note 35, 
at 21. For negative consequences following complaints about compensation, 
see WILLIAMS & RICHARDSON, supra note 35, at 38. 
37 RHODE, supra note 8, at 162. The problem is true of employment 
discrimination litigation generally. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Watched 
Variable Improves: On Eliminating Sex Discrimination in Employment, in 
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 10, at 296, 309–10; 
Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical 
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 663.  
38 PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN 
AMERICA 59 (1998) (quoting George Galland).  
39 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 166.  
40 BARRETT, supra note 38, at 154.  
41 DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF 
APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 14 (2010) (quoting Jennifer Pizer).  
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was not permitted to sleep in the barracks, eat in the mess hall, 
work on the newspaper, or play in the marching band.42 She 
received multiple death threats, her family’s house was 
vandalized, and her sex life was the subject of frequent 
speculation in school publications.43 “Die Shannon” greeted her 
from a Charleston billboard; “Go Home” and “Save the Males” 
appeared on campus signs and banners.44  
III. WINNERS AND LOSERS  
So what might make litigating discrimination claims worth 
these risks? What constitutes winning and what might predict it? 
Empirical research on employment discrimination generally uses 
money as the metric of a “favorable” outcome. But qualitative 
studies of dispute resolution techniques make clear the need for 
more sophisticated measures of success.45 Complainants’ 
satisfaction is not always determined by monetary compensation. 
Nor are their interests the only concern in assessing the societal 
contributions of legal proceedings.  
Although we lack systematic data on broader measures of 
winning and losing in the discrimination context, the case studies 
that are available suggest two key questions to consider. To 
                                                 
42 Manegold, supra note 34.  
43 CATHERINE S. MANEGOLD, IN GLORY’S SHADOW: SHANNON 
FAULKNER, THE CITADEL, AND A CHANGING AMERICA 21, 182 (2000); 
Manegold, supra note 34.  
44 MANEGOLD, supra note 43, at 21, 206.  
45 For such studies in the context of negotiated agreements, see generally 
Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Noah Eisenkraft, The Objective 
Value of Subjective Value: A Multi-Round Negotiation Study, 40 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 690 (2010); Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & 
Heng Xu, What Do People Value When They Negotiate? Mapping the 
Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 493 (2006); Michele J. Gelfand et al., Negotiating Relationally: 
The Dynamics of the Relational Self in Negotiations, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
427 (2007); and Tom R. Tyler & S.L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295 (Michele J. Gelfand & 
Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004). For dispute resolution generally, see E. ALLEN 
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
(1988).  
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what extent did the plaintiffs get what they wanted? And were 
they able to use the experience to improve their lives, their 
institutions, or the opportunities for other potential victims of 
discrimination? Although many factors that affect a judgment are 
beyond the control of complainants, and indeed may have little 
to do with the objective “merits” of a claim, litigants have more 
influence over the meaning of the experience than they often 
realize.46 
Individuals bring discrimination cases for multiple reasons, 
but most plaintiffs share one overriding interest: the desire for 
vindication. Complainants generally see themselves as victims of 
injustice for which the law should provide some remedy. Clare 
Dalton reported a sense of anger; she believed her work was 
“tenure-worthy” and that the process had been tainted by 
political and gender bias.47 Nancy Ezold similarly felt that she 
had been “as good or better as many of the men the firm 
promoted.”48 Ezold also believed that other women at the firm 
were subject to the same injustice and she wanted to do 
something to “improve their situation.”49 Lawrence Mungin felt  
doubly burned at Katten Muchen. He had defined himself 
largely in terms of professional success. The law firm 
crushed that self image by making him feel like a failure. 
Worse, he had walked away feeling foolish that for his 
whole life, he had “gone the extra mile to show 
people . . . that I wasn’t one of those blacks, one of the 
dangerous ones, the bad ones. Or one of the complainers, 
the ones demanding special treatment . . . . I wanted to 
                                                 
46 For example, the rating that EEOC experts give to a claim does not 
predict outcome. More important factors include whether the party has legal 
representation and whether the claim is part of a class action. Nielsen, Nelson 
& Lancaster, supra note 1, at 191–92. Other obvious factors that affect trial 
outcomes include the abilities of counsel, the resources of the parties, and the 
sympathies of judges and jurors.  
47 Bernstein, supra note 23 (quoting Dalton on tenure-worthy work); 
Alice Dembner, MCAD Leans on Harvard in Gender Bias Case, BOS. 
GLOBE, July 28, 1993, at M13 (quoting Dalton on bias); Doten, supra note 
33 (quoting Dalton on anger).  
48 Rhode, supra note 18, at 242 (quoting Ezold).  
49 Id.  
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show that I was like white people . . . one of the good 
blacks.” But that hadn’t been enough.50  
Shannon Faulkner was also driven by anger after the Citadel 
rescinded her admission upon learning that she was female. Her 
brother was then thriving as a naval recruit. It seemed unjust to 
deny her similar chances for a military career.51 Although she 
had not been sure that she wanted to attend the school, and 
later, she struggled with the decision whether to file a lawsuit, 
once the Citadel made clear its intention to fight her access, 
Faulkner’s resolve stiffened and she felt she could not “back 
out[,]”: “This [was] what I’ve been working for.”52  
Money, of course, often plays a role in a plaintiff’s decision 
to sue. For Hopkins it was the driving force. In describing her 
reaction when Price Waterhouse denied her partnership, she 
recalled: “For the first time since I graduated from college, I 
was unemployed and scared to death at the prospect of running 
out of money.”53 Lawrence Mungin was also anxious for a 
recovery that would make up some of the difference between his 
law firm salary and his income from temporary contract work. 
For most of these plaintiffs, as with employment 
discrimination complainants generally, legal outcomes fell far 
short of their original goals, and it is difficult to identify factors 
that might have guaranteed better results. The most systematic 
research to date finds that the factors most correlated with 
favorable monetary awards are having a lawyer, and being part of 
a class action or other collective mobilization effort.54 Notably, 
the merits of a claim, even when assessed by disinterested Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) experts, are not 
accurate predictors of financial success.55  
Nor is winning in that sense an accurate gauge of the 
broader personal and social impact of litigation. Of the cases 
discussed here, only Hopkins got full compensation for her 
                                                 
50 BARRETT, supra note 38, at 5–6 (quoting Mungin).  
51 Manegold, supra note 34. 
52 Id. (quoting Faulkner); see MANEGOLD, supra note 43, at 160.  
53 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 165. 
54 Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 1, at 192.  
55 See id.  
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financial losses. But oddly enough, the experience seemed to do 
little to equip or inspire her to advance gender equity outside the 
context of her own case. For Hopkins, the personal was simply 
personal, not political. Her autobiography recounts no efforts to 
level the playing field at Price Waterhouse once she was 
reinstated. Nor does it suggest a full appreciation of the sexual 
stereotypes that her lawsuit was challenging. With no sense of 
irony, she recounts friends’ characterizations of opposing 
counsel at the Supreme Court argument. The lawyer was 
“dowdy”; she wore an “awful black suit and no jewelry,” and 
could have benefited from makeup.56 This from a woman whose 
discrimination case was built on similar criticisms of her own 
cosmetic deficits.  
By contrast, Nancy Ezold was a loser financially. Not only did 
she fail to recover her losses in compensation and career 
opportunities, she also had to pay her opponents’ appellate 
expenses as well as her own out of pocket costs.57 But she turned 
the outcome into something “positive” by using it to launch a new 
career.58 The publicity that the case generated put her in touch with 
women who had similar stories, and she developed a profitable 
practice in sex discrimination litigation.59 The litigation also served 
as a “wake up call” to the profession in general, and Wolf Block 
in particular. At the time Ezold sued, only one of the firm’s fifty-
five litigation partners was female.60 That quickly changed, 
although some of the women who benefited from the firm’s efforts 
to refurbish its reputation paid a price in credibility: the label 
“Ezold partner” was hard to shake.61 Yet in assessing that legacy, 
the question is always “compared to what?” No one wants to be 
perceived as getting a job solely because she is a woman, but it is 
still better than not getting a job for that reason.62  
                                                 
56 HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 294; see also Estlund, supra note 12, at 82 
(commenting on the irony of these characterizations).  
57 See Rhode, supra note 18, at 253.  
58 Id. (quoting Ezold).  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 See RHODE, supra note 8, at 169 (quoting Barbara Babcock).  
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Lawrence Mungin’s story also had mixed results. 
Financially, there was no happy ending. And although he “never 
wanted publicity,” Mungin got plenty.63 In the book that his 
Harvard roommate, Paul Barrett, wrote about the case, Mungin 
seemed to have lost in a deeper sense as well. He had spent 
much of his career attempting to be seen as “not merely, not 
primarily, black.”64 He had resisted being involved with racial 
issues at the firm or mentoring other lawyers of color because 
he “didn’t want to be typecast as an African-American big 
brother . . . .”65 Yet “by suing his employer, Mungin . . . 
ensured that everyone would see him primarily in terms of 
race.”66 Mungin himself, however, viewed the experience in a 
more positive light. “I feel I have won,” he told a National Law 
Journal reporter after the book came out.67 Although still “very, 
very angry” with Barrett for his “violation of trust,” Mungin 
felt that the book accomplished something by “hit[ting] [Katten 
Muchen] where it hurts.”68 The publication also forced him to 
“see the world as it really is,” and to face up to his own “worst 
fears” about how much race mattered.69 Yet, when asked 
whether he hoped for a “broader victory” from his lawsuit, “one 
that could help other minorities as they follow similar career 
paths,” Mungin responded, “I never felt I had to carry that 
burden.”70 Apparently, nothing about the litigation experience 
increased his willingness to assume that responsibility.  
Shannon Faulkner also got a discomforting look at the 
“world as it really is,” and the limits of law in addressing it. 
Her victory in the Supreme Court did not bring victory in the 
world outside it. The Justices could command her admission but 
not her acceptance at the Citadel. After five days of life as a 
full-time cadet with federal marshal protection, physical and 
                                                 
63 Coyle, supra note 35, at A14 (quoting Mungin).  
64 BARRETT, supra note 38, at 282.  
65 Id. at 43. 
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psychological stress forced her withdrawal. Despite the 
humiliation of a nationally televised exit, surrounded by jeering 
jubilant cadets, Faulkner expressed no regrets. As she told 
reporters later, she had opened the door for other women who 
are at the Citadel now and “that’s my prize . . . . [T]hey have 
that choice.”71 Ironically enough, Faulkner’s unsuccessful but 
well-publicized efforts to withstand harassment may have done 
more to advance the cause of gender equity than her graduation 
would have accomplished. By exposing virulent sexism to public 
view, her case galvanized forces for change, both within and 
outside the military.72 The Louts of Discipline, a Time story on 
Faulkner’s departure, chronicled her abusive treatment and made 
clear that while she may not have needed the Citadel, “the 
Citadel surely need[ed] her” or others like her.73 On the fifteenth 
anniversary of Faulkner’s Citadel challenge, an ABC news 
segment summed it up: “in losing her own battle, she won the 
war for so many others.”74 
The outcome of Clare Dalton’s suit against Harvard Law 
School was similar to that of most discrimination plaintiffs in 
that it ended short of total victory. But what makes her story 
uniquely inspiring is the way that she turned difficult 
circumstances to the service of broader goals. From the outset, 
the deck was stacked against winning, either by conventional 
definitions or even by her own standards. What she wanted 
most, she told reporters at the time, was “an apology.”75 And 
that, she and her lawyer came to realize, she would never get. 
Even if she had won a judgment from the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, and even if that judgment 
was affirmed in court, Harvard would never acknowledge that 
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its processes had been anything but meritocratic. As the 
university’s (female) lawyer stated on the eve of the Commission 
hearing: “Our position is that she was treated fairly . . . . There 
was no discrimination on the basis of gender or any other 
grounds.”76  
What, then, was the best that could have come from a 
prolonged legal battle? Although Dalton might have obtained a 
significant monetary judgment, that would not have changed the 
quality of her life. She was not in financial need. She held 
another position with adequate pay, as did her husband. She 
might have been reinstated at Harvard, but what would her 
experience there have been like if she obtained the position by 
humiliating colleagues in courtroom proceedings? The institution 
was already known as the “Beirut of legal education.”77 A highly 
publicized discrimination suit, destined to drag on for years, 
might simply have made matters worse, and delayed Dalton’s 
efforts to do something more productive with her talents and 
commitments. 
To her enormous credit, she identified an alternative 
resolution that Harvard could accept. The University agreed to 
contribute a quarter of a million dollars to create a joint 
Northeastern-Harvard Institute on Domestic Violence that Dalton 
would direct.78 In commenting on the settlement, she stated,  
It is fitting that if Harvard [is] going to pay a price for 
gender discrimination, it should . . . help women who 
are the most egregious victims . . . . In addition, this 
gives me the professional opportunities that mean the 
most to me at this time in my career.79 
Harvard’s attorney applauded the agreement, not only because it 
ended a divisive and expensive battle, but also because it did so 
“in a way that everyone feels is going to do something good for 
                                                 
76 Dembner, supra note 47, at M13 (quoting Harvard attorney Ann 
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the community . . . . Clare [deserves] a lot of credit for coming 
up with the idea and being willing to accept it.”80  
Not only did Dalton accept the settlement, she embraced it in 
ways that left no one feeling that this was some second-best 
outcome. “I belong at Northeastern in ways I never did at 
Harvard,” she told the press.81 “I don’t want to sound 
Pollyanna-ish, but . . . I like myself better than the person I 
would have been at Harvard. I’ve learned so much about how 
our culture works, the pervasiveness of discrimination, and what 
it takes to [overcome it].”82 Unlike other discrimination litigants 
who became “accidental feminists” when their own cases 
demanded it, Dalton was a committed advocate for women 
before her litigation and an even stronger one in its wake.83 At a 
panel sponsored by the Society for Alternative Law Teaching, 
Dalton concluded her remarks with her own definition of 
success:  
it is important to hang on to the idea that winning isn’t 
everything. Waging the fight for as long as you can, 
knowing when to stop, and coming out of it personally 
intact, ready for the next venture, whatever that may 
be—that, it seems to me, is what it means to make a 
success of experience of discrimination.84  
The legacy of Dalton’s “next venture” in violence work at 
Northeastern speaks for itself. The example she provides for 
employment discrimination complainants should do so as well.  
How often could other litigants accomplish what Dalton did? 
Clearly in some cases, no such settlement is possible. The kind 
of compromise that the Citadel was prepared to offer was clearly 
inadequate: an alternative program at another school with 
nothing like its own reputation and resources. But it is 
conceivable that some defendants in discrimination cases might 
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accept results that do not acknowledge wrongdoing, but that 
serve the community, assist complainants, and prevent 
embarrassing public disclosures. Wolf Block partners, for 
example, were opposed to settling Ezold’s claim because of 
concerns about reputation. The firm was founded in response to 
anti-Semitism, and the partners “accused of discrimination . . . 
had spent much of their careers fighting against it.”85 Yet the 
Ezold litigation also took a considerable reputational toll. Public 
disclosures of demeaning comments about both male and female 
lawyers seriously damaged internal relations as well as external 
recruiting efforts.86 In reflecting on the firm’s decision not to 
settle the case, one firm leader concluded: “This may have been 
a case that wasn’t worth winning.”87 At the very least, it was a 
case that might have benefited from more creative problem 
solving.  
It may be asking a lot from both sides in discrimination 
cases to set aside their desires for total vindication. But as the 
preceding overview suggests, there are many other ways to 
define winning. Plaintiffs can use their legal leverage in multiple 
ways: to make law, to make money, to make a point, to make 
change, and to remake themselves. Clare Dalton’s case 
somehow managed to do all of the above, and I am grateful for 
this opportunity to celebrate that unique and lasting achievement.  
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